Recently in Maintenance Category

June 24, 2015


Venue and motions to change venue in Wisconsin courts are governed by the statutes found at Wis. Stats. § 801.50 through § 801.64. Those statutes apply to family law cases through §767.201 and the related residency requirements of § 767.301.

Family law cases, however, are unique in their continuing nature. While most types of cases are finalized after entry of judgment (except, of course, for appeal remands and sometimes enforcement issues), family law cases frequently require the court's continuing action after entry of judgment for modification of placement or custody, modification or termination of child support, maintenance issues, placement enforcement, etc. As families move around the state in our mobile society, venue issues often arise: which county is most convenient for the parties, where is most of the relevant information located, etc.

The family code, § 767.281, provides a simple way to change venue for post-judgment modification and enforcement motions, petitions, and orders to show cause. With the title, "Filing procedures and orders for enforcement or modification of judgments or orders," one might not expect this statute to provide a useful mechanism for transferring a post-judgment family case to a more convenient or appropriate county, which perhaps explains why the statute and procedure are little used or understood. But in an appropriate case, this statute can simplify and streamline procedures as families move around the state.

While the statute does not explicitly authorize the filing of a post-judgment motion in a county other than that of the original judgment, its language implicitly permits it by setting forth the procedure to be followed when a post-judgment motion is filed in a new county. Pursuant to Subsection (1m), if a post-judgment motion is brought in a county other than the county that entered the judgment or order, the moving party is required to send a copy of the motion to the original county, along with a copy of the new summons. Then, if a dispute arises regarding which court should exercise jurisdiction, both judges and all counsel "may" hold a conference to resolve the issue. Once a new order is entered in the new county, the moving party must send a copy to the original court.

Subsection (2) sets forth additional, more specific provisions where the post-judgment motion concerns child support, family support, or maintenance payments. These post-judgment motions must be brought in the original county or in the county where the minor children "reside," unless the parties stipulate to filing in another county or the original court finds good cause for the motion to be filed in another county.

At Wessel, Lehker & Fumelle, we have used this statute to change venue for post-judgment proceedings quickly and easily. We have also found, however, that courts and opposing counsel frequently are unaware of the statute and the simplified procedures it provides. Successfully utilizing the statute often requires educating the court.

May 21, 2015


Last year, in the context of divorce, we blogged about enforcement of and challenges to the property division provisions of a marital property agreement, or prenup. Under Wisconsin law, courts must presume that these provisions are valid and enforceable unless the prenup is shown to be inequitable. Caselaw, beginning with Button v. Button, has interpreted the meaning of "inequitable" under these circumstances.

But the analysis is different for prenup provisions regarding maintenance (alimony) at divorce. While property division provisions are governed by Wis. Stat. § 767.61, maintenance provisions are governed by Wis. Stat. § 767.56(1c)(h). That statute provides that an agreement "concerning any arrangement for the financial support of the parties" is a factor the trial court must consider in making a maintenance decision. A prenup thus is just one factor regarding maintenance to be considered by the trial court, along with other factors such as the length of the marriage, the parties' earning capacity, etc. The factors are listed at Wis. Stat. § 767.56(1c), along with the catch-all "such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant."

The difference is significant. Regarding property division, the burden is on the spouse who is challenging the prenup to show that it is inequitable; if the spouse cannot make such a showing, the inquiry ends and the terms of the prenup are enforced. Regarding maintenance, there is no presumption, no shifting of the burden between spouses; rather, the trial court weighs the evidence and exercises its discretion in determining maintenance. The focus is not on the prenup itself, but on the prenup in the context of the statutory maintenance factors and the twin maintenance objectives, support and fairness. See, e.g., Hefty v. Hefty.

September 19, 2012


About once a year here at Wessel, Lehker & Fumelle we encounter an opposing party who is intent on hiding income. A party's income, of course, is highly relevant information for purposes of setting maintenance (alimony), establishing child support, or changing the amount of maintenance or child support. Some support payers are working on perfecting the art of hiding or disguising income or assets, treating the support recipient much like they probably treat the IRS.

The signs are often fairly obvious. A party may report an income that barely covers expenses, yet take lavish vacations or acquire expensive toys. Or a party, often self-employed, may report an income that is substantially lower than it was before the parties split. Sometimes a party reports the former partner's penchant for half-truths and misrepresentation. A party's exhaustive or creative opposition to reasonable financial disclosure may signal interesting records.

Fortunately, the statutes authorizing access to information are broad in Wisconsin. Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 804 authorizes discovery of all "relevant" information, whether or not it is actually admissible at trial. And courts have little tolerance for parties who play loose with the facts. Once we can show some manipulation or lack of candor, courts are often willing to authorize a deeper investigation or impute income. We have also found that when the opposing party realizes that we are not simply going to accept the represented income as the whole truth, a reasonable settlement suddenly becomes more attractive.

Conversely, we sometimes have clients or potential clients who try to enlist us in their efforts to hide income or assets. We always push for full, accurate disclosure - not only because it's the right thing to do, but also because any other course exposes a party to significant risk. In Marriage of Lellman, for example, the trial court estimated Lellman's net income at $100,000, rather than the $11,000 Lellman claimed. The court of appeals affirmed: "Because Lellman did not produce the necessary financial records and because he intentionally misrepresented both his income and expenses, the trial court was left to determine a reasonable figure attributable to Lellman as a net annual income. . . . [N]ot only may Lellman's conduct be punishable as contempt or perjury, but [] it was Lellman's misconduct that placed the court in the position of being required to make reasonable approximations. Lellman cannot be heard to complain that this approximation was excessive when the precise information available to make that determination was in his exclusive control." Lellman also was ordered to pay his former wife's attorney fees.

If necessary, we will withdraw from a case rather than ignore a client's unethical behavior.